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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 





ROBERT R. SATHER and 
BONNIE LEE SATHER, 
Defendants, Appellants 
and Cross-Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF ON APPEAL 
Case No. 16017 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT OF 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
HONORABLE DAVID SAM, JUDGE 
STATE!1ENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves the ownership of and the respective 
interests of the parties in and to real property situate in 
Uintah County, State of Utah. Plaintiff claims damages from 
defendants for taking possession of said property, and defendants 
SATHER claim reimbursement from the plaintiff for money with 
interest thereon advanced for plaintiff's benefit by defendants 
SATHER in connection with said land. 
DISPOSITION IN LOHER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury upon special interroga~ .• 
tories. The jury found that plaintiff was the owner of the real 
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property and was entitled ta possession thereof upon its pnying 
to the defendants SATHER, the sum of $21,500.00. The jury 
further found that defendant ROBERT R. SATHER had acted "wilfully 
and maliciously" tmvard the plaintiff in taking possession of 
said property, but a\Varded no damages to the plaintiff as a 
consequence thereof. The trial court, upon motion of the 
defendants after the jury had been discharged, declined to 
allow defendant's interest on the money found by the jury to 
be due from the plaintiff to the defendants. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek reversal of the jury finding that 
defendant ROBERT R. SATHER \Vas guilty of "wilful and malicious" 
conduct toward the plaintiff; defendants seek a determination 
that the plaintiff owes defendants the sum of $46,560.00 for 
money advanced for plaintiff's benefit by the defendants; and 
defendants seek a further determination that defendants are 
entitled to interest on the sums owing from plaintiff to the 
defendants. Defendants, in the alternative, seek a new trial 
on such issues. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 11, 1972, the plaintiff signed a note in 
favor of the FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH (EX 22-P; TR-29), 
which note was secured by a trust deed to the real property 
involved in this suit. This real property is referred to by 
-2-
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the parties as the Moss Ranch. In a separate transaction, 
but also on October 11, 1972~ plaintiff and the defendant 
ROBERT R. SATHER entered i~to an Agreement which in essence 
provided that since the defendants SATHER had guaranteed 
plaintiff's payment of said note to the FIRST SECURITY BANK, 
if plaintiff failed to pay such note according to its terms 
and the defendants were required to pay off that note by reason 
of the said guarantee, defendant SATHER was to receive a 
Warranty Deed to the same property as that covered by the Trust 
Deed to the FIRST SECURITY BANK (EX 22-P). Plaintiff also on 
October 11, 1972, executed a Warranty Deed in favor of defendant 
SATHER covering the same property known as the Moss Ranch (EX 32-P; 
TR-63). The said Agreement and the Warranty Deed were both 
delivered to the FIRST SECURITY BANK in conjunction with said 
Trust Deed (TR-62). 
The note of October 11, 1972, was subsequently 
refinanced and additional money was loaned by the FIRST SECURITY 
BANK to the plaintiff on September 15, 1973. On that date, 
plaintiff signed another Trust Deed Note in the sum of $50,000.00 
in favor of the FIRST SECURITY BANK (EX 24-P; TR-98), $20,000.00 
of which constituted a renewal of the earlier note and $30,000.00 
of which was a new loan (EX 23-P; TR-31). The new note was 
likewise secured by a Trust Deed dated dated September 15, 1973, 
covering the Moss Ranch upon which the FIRST SECURITY BANK was 
designated as beneficiary (EX 37-D; TR-67,68). The $30,000.00 
of new money was credited to the account of the plaintiff at 
-3-
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FIRST SECURITY BANK, Roosevelt, Utah (TR-67). Also, on 
September 15, 1973, plaintiff and defendant ROBERT R. SATHER 
entered into an Agreement similar to their earlier arrangement, 
which Agreement provided that in consideration of the defendant's 
guarantee of payment, should the plaintiff default in timely 
payment to the FIRST SECURITY BANK, and should the defendants 
pay off the note pursuant to their guarantee, the FIRST SECURITY 
BANK was to deliver the lvarranty Deed of October ll, 1972, to 
defendant SATHER (EX 3-P; TR-24). The original of this second 
Agreement between plaintiff and defendant ROBERT R. SATHER was 
concurrently delivered to the FIRST SECURITY BANK with the 
Trust Deed and Note signed by the plaintiff (TR-24). 
In furtherance of the said Agreement, the defendants 
SATHER on September 21, 1973, executed and delivered to the FIRST 
SECURITY BANK a guaranty document in favor of the FIRST SECURITY 
BANK, whereby the defendants agreed to absolutely guarantee 
payment of all sums the plaintiff then owed or should ever owe 
to the FIRST SECURITY BANK. This guaranty was for an unlimited 
amount (EX 42-D; TR-31). 
On September 25, 1973, plaintiff issued its check 
payable to defendant ROBERT R. SATHER for the sum of $25,000.00, 
which check was drawn on the Roosevelt Utah office of the FIRST 
SECURITY BANK (EX 31-P). Plaintiff contended at the trial that 
this money was a loan to enable defendant Sather to buy diamonds 
and to cover some overdraft checks (TR-64-66). Defendant SATHER 
contended that the money '"as given to him by plaintiff tmvard~ .. 
-4-
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repayment of prior debts o>va,d to the defendant SATHER by th~ 
plaintiff and plaintiff's president, Pete Buffo (TR-257,258; 
EX 60-D; TR-106). 
On September 25, 1973, defendant SATHER, using said 
check given him by the plaintiff, purchased Savings Certificate 
No. 19479 in the ar:~ount of $25,000.00 from the FIRST SECURITY 
BANK (EX 56-P; TR-30,31), and immediately pledged said 
certificate to the FIRST SECURITY BANK as additional security 
for the plaintiff's $50,000.00 loan which had been guaranteed 
by the defendants (EX 24-P; EX 23-P; EX 68-P; TR-161,162,258, 
259). 
By March 1974, plaintiff was in default in making 
timely payments on the note of September 15, 1973, to the FIRST 
SECURITY BANK (TR-136,261). On March 15, 1974, defendant SATHER 
paid off the existing unpaid balance of said note to the FIRST 
SECURITY BANK in the sum of $46,560.00 pursuant to defendants' 
guaranty (EX 49-P; TR-39,143,194,260,261; EX 27-P). In making 
said payoff, defendant SATHER cashed in and applied the said 
Savings Certificate No. 19479 (EX 56-P), and drew the rest of 
the money from his business accounts (EX 58-P; EX 68-P; TR-261). 
After paying off said note, defendant SATHER requested 
the FIRST SECURITY BANK to deliver to him the Deed of October ll, 
1972 (EX 32-P), then being held by the FIRST SECURITy BANK under 
the provisions of the Agreement between plaintiff and defendant 
SATHER dated September 15, 1973 (EX 3-P). The FIRST SECURITY 
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delivered said Warranty DeeJ to defendant SATHER (EX 27-P; 
TR-194). 
On or about March 15, 1974, defendant ROBERT R. SATHER 
entered into some arrangements with James A. Sheya to borrow 
the sum of $70,000.00, which arrangements contemplated that 
defendant SATHER would deed the Moss Ranch property to Sheya 
as security for that loan. Such a deed was recorded by defendant 
SATHER on March 25, 1974, in the office of the Uintah County 
Recorder (EX 9-P; EX 72-P). However, no money was ever actually 
advanced by Sheya to SATHER because it was then discovered by 
defendant SATHER before he obtained any money from Sheya that 
plaintiff on November 2, 1973, had caused a Trust Deed to be 
recorded against the Moss Ranch ostensibly to secure a loan from 
Silvio Fassio to plaintiff for the sum of $150,000.00 (EX 59-D; 
TR-181,183,262,263). A deed back from Sheya to defendant SATHER 
was later recorded on May 15, 1975 (EX-10-P; TR-263). 
When defendant ROBERT R. SATHER discovered the said 
$150,000.00 Trust Deed on the county records in favor of Silvio 
Fassio, he requested and received from the FIRST SECURITY BANK 
an assignment of plaintiff's $50,000.00 Trust Deed dated 
September 15, 1973, which had been paid off by defendant SATHER 
on or about March 15, 1974. This Assignment was dated and 
delivered to defendant SATHER by FIRST SECURITY BANK on or about 
April 5, 1974 (EX 48-P; TR-195,262). 
During or about the month of April 1974, plaintiff 
learned that the Deed of October 11, 1972 (EX 32-P) had been 
-6-
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I 
delivered to the defendant SATHER by the FIRST SECURITY BANK 
(TR-82,262). Plaintiff at that time demanded a reconveyance of 
the property, but defendant SATHER declined to do so until he 
was paid the sum of $46,560.00 by plaintiff, which amount is the 
sum defendant SATHER paid to the FIRST SECURITY BANK in connection 
with defendant SATHER'S guarantee of plaintiff's $50,000.00 Trust 
Deed Note (TR-86,261,264,265). 
Plaintiff contended that the FIRST SECURITY BANK 
should have never in any event delivered the Deed of October 11, 
1972 (EX 32-P), to the defendants SATHER because the Agreement 
of September 15, 1973 (EX 3-P), providing for delivery of the 
deed to the Moss Ranch to the defendant SATHER in the event the 
defendant SATHER paid off plaintiff's $50,000.00 note, was 
cancelled by further agreement between plaintiff and defendant 
SATHER as of September 16, 1973 (EX 4-P). At the trial, defendant 
SATHER did not deny that said document of cancellation (EX 4-P) 
bore his signature, but he did not recall signing the same and 
did not recall ever seeing such document until he was served 
with a copy of the Complaint in this matter (TR-180,260). 
Plaintiff testified that plaintiff's Exhibit #4 was signed by 
defendant ROBERT SATHER at plaintiff's office in Torrence, 
California on or about September 15, 1973 (TR-64,67). Plaintiff 
further testified and offered evidence that it notified the 
FIRST SECURITY BANK of said cancellation (EX 4-P), both by 
telephone and in writing, in December of 1973, and again in 
March of 1974 (EX 5-P; EX 6-P; TR-70-76). The officers of 
-7-
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FIRST SECURITY BANK denied ever receiving any such notices of 
cancellation, as did defendant SATHER (TR-260). 
Plaintiff did not at any time tender any sum to 
defendant SATHER for a reconveyance of the Hoss Ranch (TR-264-266), 
although plaintiff did by letter addressed to defendant SATHER 
on September 25, 1974, acknowledge a responsibility for the sum 
of $46,000.00 in connection with the property in question 
(EX 71-D). 
Plaintiff filed suit on or about January 29, 1976, 
against defendants SATHER (R 1-17) seeking compensatory and 
punitive damages for the withholding of the property; to reform 
the Warranty Deed of October 11, 1972 (EX 32-P), to a security 
instrument securing the guarantee of defendant SATHER (EX 3-P; 
EX 42-D); and to permit plaintiff to regain the Moss Ranch by 
its paying to the defendant SATHER the amount of the plaintiff's 
Trust Deed to the FIRST SECURITY BANK (EX 37-D), which had been 
assigned by the FIRST SECURITY BANK to defendant SATHER (EX 48-P). 
The case was tried to a jury. At the close of 
plaintiff's case, defendant SATHER moved the Court for a 
directed verdict (TR-249), and the Court denied the motion with 
leave to renew the motion at the conclusion of all of the 
evidence (TR-268). Defendants SATHER renewed their motion for 
a directed verdict at the conclusion of all of the evidence 
(TR-296), which motion was denied by the Court (TR-301). 
-8-
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I 
The case was thereupon submitted to the jury upon 
special interrogatories (R 598-601). The jury found that 
defendant ROBERT R. SATHER was guilty of wilful and malicious 
conduct toward the plaintiff, but that the plaintiff suffered 
no damages by reason thereof, and that the plaintiff owed the 
sum of $21,500.00 to the defendant SATHER in order to regain 
possession of the Moss Ranch (R 600-601). 
Defendants SATHER subsequently filed a Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (R 605-608), and submitted 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lau and a proposed 
Judgment on the Verdict which provided for interest on the money 
found by the jury to be due from the plaintiff to the defendant 
SATHER as a condition for the return of the Moss Ranch to the 
plaintiff (R 625-626; R 653-657; R 661-666). The court belou 
denied defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdit, declined to award interest to the defendants SATHER 
(R 669), and entered its Order and Judgment accordingly (R 670-
671). From this Order and Judgment defendants SATHER have 
taken their appeal (R 672-673). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE HAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT 
OF THE JURY TO THE EFFECT THAT DEFENDANT ROBERT R. SATHER WAS 
GUILTY OF 1\fiLFUL AND NALICIOUS CONDUCT TOWARD THE PLAINTIFF 
AND THE COURT BELOH ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT THE MOTION OF 
-9-
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DEFENDANT SATHER FOR JUDGl1ENT NOT\HTHSTANDING THE VERDICT IN 
RESPECT THEREOF. 
Defendants recognize that under the law of this state, 
the verdict of the jury and the actions of the trial court 
thereon should be upheld unless it appears that the evidence 
so clearly preponderates against them that it is evident an 
injustice has resulted. (BEZNER VS. CONTINENTAL DRY CLEANERS 
INC., 548 P. 2d 898; UTAH STATE ROAD COMMISSION VS. THE STEELE 
RANCH, 533 P. 2d 888; KOER VS MAYFAIR MARKETS, 19 Utah 2d 339, 
431 P. 2d 566; TAYLOR VS. KEITH O'BRIEN INC., 537 P 2d 1022). 
Defendants submit that the evidence in this case clearly 
preponderates against a finding of malice on the part of 
defendant ROBERT R. SATHER. 
"Halice" means a motive and willingness to vex, 
harass, annoy or injure (52 AH. JUR. 2d 161). The court below 
so instructed the jury (Inst. #25, R 516). The evidence received 
at the trial and offered by the plaintiff to support its con-
tention that defendant ROBERT R. SATHER acted with malice shows 
the follo>ving: 
(a) Defendant ROBERT SATHER signed plaintiff's Exhibit #4 
(b) 
purporting to cancel the agreement between the parties 
pertaining to the Warranty Deed from plaintiff to 
defendant SATHER (EX 32-P; TR-64,67). 
Plaintiff had letters prepared and addressed to the 
FIRST SECURITY BANK advising that the Agreement 
between the plaintiff and the defendant SATHER with 
-10-
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respect to the said Warranty Deed had been cancelled. 
Said letters also contained wording to the effect 
"cc: R.R. Sather and cc/Robert Sather" (EX 5-P; EX 6-P); 
however, defendants cannot find in the record that 
plaintiff presented evidence that copies of such 
letters were actually mailed to the defendant 
SATHER (TR-71). 
(c) Pete Buffo, president of plaintiff, testified that 
he talked to defendant ROBERT SATHER on the telephone 
about the cancellation document in December of 1973 
(TR-72). 
(d) Defendant ROBERT SATHER did not tell the FIRST SECURITY 
BANK about the cancellation document (EX 4-P) prior 
to obtaining the Warranty Deed to the Moss Ranch from 
the FIRST SECURITY BANK (TR-201,202). 
(e) Defendant obtained the Warranty Deed from the plaintiff 
to defendant SATHER from the FIRST SECURITY BAW~ in 
March of 1974 upon the strength of the agreement of 
September 15, 1973 (EX 3-P), which plaintiff contended 
was cancelled as of September 16, 1973 by plaintiff's 
Exhibit ii4. 
(f) Defendant SATHER attempted to encumber the Moss Ranch 
to James A. Sheya on Harch 15, 1974 (EX 9-P; EX 72-P). 
(g) Defendant SATHER obtained an Assignment of the First 
Security Bank Trust Deed of September 15, 1973, on 
April 5, 1974 (EX 48-P). .. .. 
-11-
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Evidence in the record which belied any malice on the 
part of defendant SATHER i.s as follo1vs: 
(a) Defendants SATHER personally guaranteed plaintiff's 
$50,000.00 note of September 15, 1973 (EX 42-D). 
(b) Plaintiff defaulted in the payment of said note and 
defendants SATHER paid the sum of $46,560.00 to the 
FIRST SECURITY BANK pursuant to said guarantee 
(EX 49-P; TR-39,143,194,260,261; EX 27-P). 
(c) Defendant SATHER was entitled to reimbursement from 
plaintiff for such payment and was entitled to at 
least a security interest in the Moss Ranch in 
connection therewith. Plaintiff acknowledged as 
much by letter and in its Complaint (EX 71-D; R 4,5; 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 7, R 556). 
(d) Defendant SATHER offered to release any interest in 
the Moss Ranch to the plaintiff in exchange for 
reimbursement for the payment made by the defendant 
SATHER to the FIRST SECURITY BANK (TR-265). 
(e) The plaintiff did not at any time offer or tender 
reimbursement to the defendant SATHER in any amount 
(TR-264,265). 
A fair interpretation of the evidence as a lvhole and 
in a light most favorable to the finding of the jury on the issue 
of malice does not demonstrate that the defendant acted maliciously 
toward the plaintiff. The defendant SATHER, by even the plaintiff's 
standard, was entitled to assert a security interest in the Moss' 
-12-
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Ranch and the actions of the defendant were not calculated to 
do othenvise. The evidenc.e is undisputed that the plaintiff 
made no offer of any amount of money to secure a release of 
defendant SATHER'S security interest in the property. Defendant 
SATHER conceded that the Warranty Deed was initially considered 
to be a security device and his actions in taking an assignment 
of the Trust Deed from the FIRST SECURITY BANK rather than 
obtaining a release upon payment of the note o;.ms justifiably 
precipitated by the defendant's discovery that the plaintiff 
had encumbered the property for an additional $150,000.00 
without the knowledge of the defendant SATHER within less than 
t'ilO months after the defendant SATHER had personally guaranteed 
plaintiff's note for $50,000.00 to the FIRST SECURITY BANK 
(EX 59-D). 
There is no reasonable basis in the evidence to 
support a finding of malice on the part of defendant ROBERT R. 
SATHER toward the plaintiff, and the finding of the jury to that 
effect should be reversed. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE REQUIRED A FUlliNG BY THE JURY THAT THE 
DEFENDAtlTS SATHER \-JERE ENTITLED TO BE PAID THE SUM OF $46,560.00, 
PLUS INTEREST, FROM THE PLAINTIFF RATHER THAN ONLY THE SUM OF 
$21,500.00. 
With respect to the Moss Ranch, the real property 
involved in this action, the jury found that the plaintiff was,. 
-13-
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the owner thereof and that ~he plaintiff was entitled to regain 
possession upon payment of the sum of $21,500.00 to the defend-
ants SATHER (R 600-601). Defendants SATHER contend that there 
was no credible evidence received at the trial to justify limit-
ing defendants' entitlement to $21,500.00. The only substantial 
evidence before the Court requires a finding that defendants 
SATHER were entitled to be awarded the sum of $46,560.00 as 
their security interest in the Moss Ranch. 
Defendants again recognize that the evidence on appeal 
after a jury verdict is to be viewed and construed most strongly 
in support of the jury's findings and that the Supreme Court 
should not change the findings of the jury \vhere there is 
competent evidence to sustain them. (BEZNER VS. CONTINENTAL DRY 
CLEANERS INC., supra.) In this case the defendants submit that 
there is no such evidence to sustain the finding of the jury on 
this point. Evidence before the jury not in dispute shows the 
following: 
(a) Defendants SATHER personally guaranteed plaintiff's 
$50,000.00 note to the FIRST SECURITY BANK (EX 3-P; 
EX 24-P; EX 42-P). Plaintiff received all of the 
proceeds from the loan (TR-35). 
(b) The loan approval required as further security a 
pledge to the FIRST SECURITY BANK of a savings 
certificate in the sum of $25,000.00 (EX 23-P). 
(c) Defendant SATHER received a $25,000.00 check from 
plaintiff (EX 31-P). 
-14-
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(d) Defendant ROBERT 3ATHER purchased a $25,000.00 
Savings Certificate No. 19479 from the FIRST 
SECURITY BANK (EX 56-P) and pledged the same with 
the FIRST SECURITY BANK as additional collateral 
for plaintiff's loan (EX 68-P). 
(e) Plaintiff defaulted under the terms of its said 
note to the FIRST SECURITY BANK (TR-136,261). 
(f) Defendant SATHER in March 1974, vlhen said note 
was then delinquent, paid off the same to the FIRST 
SECURITY BANK in the amount of $46,560.00 pursuant 
to the terms of defendants' guarantee to the bank 
(EX 49-P). 
(g) In order to raise the said sum of $46,560.00, 
defendant SATHER cashed in Savings Certificate No. 
19479 in the amount of $25,000.00 and made up the 
difference from his business accounts (TR-261). 
(h) Defendant SATHER took an assignment of plaintiff's 
note to the FIRST SECURITY BANK from the FIRST SECURITY 
BANK so that defendants then became the owners of 
said note and Trust Deed securing the same (EX 48-P). 
Instruction #13 (R 504) given by the court below to 
the jury, and to which the plaintiff took no exception (TR-309), 
reads as follows: 
"When one person guarantees to pay a past due 
obligation that a debtor owes to a creditor, and 
when the guarantor actually pays to the creditor 
a past due obligation owed the creditor by the 
debtor, the guarantor then stands in the shoes 
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of the creditor and is entitled to all rights 
and security the creditor had against the debtor. 
Therefore, if you find by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the defendant ROBERT SATHER guaranteed 
the obligation UTE-CAL LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
owed to the defendant bank, and that after default 
by UTE-CAL LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ROBERT SATHER 
paid the bank the money that UTE-CAL owed by reason 
of UTE-CAL'S default, then upon payment, MR. SATHER 
was entitled to have assigned to him all rights the 
bank originally had against UTE-CAL LAND DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION, including the assignment of the bank's 
interest in the Trust Deed of September 15, 1973." 
The only possible evidence in the record of the trial 
to justify reducing defendant SATHER'S claim under the said 
security arrangement to $21,500.00, rather than the $46,560.00 
actually paid by defendant SATHER on plaintiff's note to the 
FIRST SECURITY BANK arises from the circumstances as above 
indicated, whereby defendant SATHER received $25,000.00 from 
plaintiff in the form of a check shortly after plaintiff received 
the proceeds of plaintiff's loan from the FIRST SECURITY BANK; 
defendant SATHER thereupon used said check to purchase a 
$25,000.00 savings certificate and pledged said certificate with 
the FIRST SECURITY BANK as additional security for plaintiff's 
loan; and thereafter used the proceeds of such savings certifi-
cate toward paying off the plaintiff's note to FIRST SECURITY 
BANK after such note became delinquent. In other words, it is 
plaintiff's contention and the jury in effect found that 
plaintiff only really borrowed $25,000.00 from the FIRST SECURITY 
BANK even though its note as guaranteed by defendants SATHER was 
for $50,000.00, because the $25,000.00 which was given to SATHER 
by plaintiff was used by SATHER to buy a savings certificate ... 
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which was ultimately used by the defendant SATHER to partially 
pay off the very loan which generated the $25,000.00 made 
available to SATHER by plaintiff in the first place. 
Whether defendant SATHER'S receipt of the $25,000.00 
from plaintiff was in itself a loan from plaintiff to defendants 
SATHER as contended by plaintiff (TR- 64,65,67), or a payment 
to defendant SATHER on a previous debt owed by plaintiff as 
contended by defendant SATHER (TR-257,258; EX 60-D; EX 71-D) 
really is immaterial. In either event, the $25,000.00 received 
by defendant SATHER from the plaintiff was defendant SATHER'S 
money. What defendant SATHER did with it was of no concern to 
the plaintiff. If in fact the money was a loan from the 
plaintiff to defendant SATHER, there is absolutely no evidence 
in the record to indicate when the money was to be repaid by 
defendant SATHER or that it was due when defendant SATHER paid 
off the FIRST SECURITY BANK in March of 1974, or that it was 
due at any other time up to and including trial of the case, so 
as to permit the plaintiff to rightfully claim an offset against 
the money paid by defendant SATHER on plaintiff's note to the 
FIRST SECURITY BANK in the amount of $46,560.00. 
There was absolutely no evidence before the jury upon 
which they could rightfully base a finding that defendants 
SATHER were entitled to anything less than the sum of $46,500.00 
in satisfaction of defendant's security interest in the Moss 
Ranch and this Court on appeal should so hold. This Court 
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stated in the case of LEt-1MOt~ VS. DENVER & RIO GRANDE vJESTERN 
RAILROAD COMPANY (9 Utah 2d 195, 341 P. 2d 215) as follows: 
"One of its most fundamental tenets is that the 
determination of the facts is left exclusively 
to the jury. It is not our prerogative to let 
our suspicions or predilections obscure our 
duty to abide by that rule. The only limitation 
thereon is that if findings are made which are 
not supported by any substantial evidence, or 
the evidence is so clear that all reasonable minds 
would find one way, so that a verdict contrary 
thereto must have resulted from passion or 
prejudice, or misconception of the law or the 
evidence, or in arbitrary disregard thereof, the 
court will exercise its inherent supervisory 
powers to administer justice, and will set the 
verdict aside." 
Defendants respectfully submit that the present case 
is one in which the Court should exercise its inherent super-
visory powers to administer justice and determine that because 
of the evidence before the Court, defendants' basic entitlement 
from the plaintiff is the sum of $46,560.00, rather than the 
sum of $21,500.00 as found by the jury. 
POINT Ill 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD INTEREST 
TO DEFENDANTS SATHER ON THE AHOUNT DUE FROM THE PLAINTIFF TO 
THE DEFENDANTS SATHER. 
Plaintiff in its Complaint alleges the validity of 
plaintiff's $50,000.00 Trust Deed and Note to the FIRST SECURITY 
BANK, which Note and Trust Deed were paid by the defendants 
SATHER and then assigned to the defendants SATHER by the 
FIRST SECURITY BANK (R 4; EX 37-D; EX 48-P). The jury found 
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I 
that the defendant SATHER wols entitled to be reimbursed for 
only the sum of $21,500.00 ciut of the total sum of $46,560.00 
paid by defendant SATHER to the FIRST SECURITY BANK on March 15, 
1974 (R 600-601; EX 49-P). 
Defendants seek interest on such sum and any additional 
sum which this Court may allow from March 14, 1974, until payment 
is made by the plaintiff. In Point II above, defendants have 
addressed their position to the effect that the jury was in 
error, reversible by this Court, for failing to find that 
defendants were entitled to reimbursement from the plaintiff 
for the full amount of $46,560.00 paid by the defendant SATHER 
to the FIRST SECURITY BANK under defendant SATHER'S guarantee 
of plaintiff's said note to the FIRST SECURITY BANK. 
No specific reference to interest was included in 
the special interrogatories submitted to the jury (R 598-601), 
but defendants SATHER submit that the law and equity nevertheless 
allow and require the Court to assess interest on the amount 
due defendants from the plaintiff. The Trust Deed Note under 
which plaintiff concedes liability in some amount provides for 
interest at the rate of 12% per annum (EX 24-P). Even in the 
absence of such a provision, the law would impose a legal rate 
of interest of 6% per annum. (See SECTION 15-1-1, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953, as amended). This Court has previously held in 
the case of WASATCH MINING COMPANY VS. CRESENT HINING COMPANY, 
7 Utah 8, 24 P. 586, that: 
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prayed: 
"Interest is allowed on debts overdue, even 
in the absence of statute or contract providing 
therefor." 
Defendants SATHER, in their Answer and Counterclaim, 
"For such other relief as to the court may seem 
equitable and just". (R-29) 
The pleadings of plaintiff and the evidence at the 
trial clearly sho'v that defendants SATHER, under their personal 
guarantee, paid money owed by the plaintiff on which an obli-
gation for interest existed (EX 24-P). The general prayer of 
defendants SATHER is adequate to support an award of interest 
under such circumstances. (See 61 Al'1. JUR. 2d SSLf-555; 22 AM. 
JUR. 2d 384). As pointed out in the case of SEARS, ROEBUCK & 
COMPANY VS. BLADE, 294 P. 2d 140 (California): 
"The matter of interest for withholding of money 
is 'embraced within the issues' and the appropri-
ate interest may be allowed even though not 
prayed for or the prayer is for less interest 
than the evidence shows to be allowable." 
The issue of interest was not specifically submitted 
to the jury, but it was an issue within the facts and evidence 
of the case as to which the Court might make a finding. A 
federal case in point, decided under RULE 49 OF THE FEDERAL 
RUT>ES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, which rule is similar to SECTION 49 
of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, is the case of HOURIKAS VS. 
VARDIANOS, 169 FED. 2d 53, in >vhich the Court held: 
"No interrogatory was submitted to the jury as to 
interest, and neither plaintiff nor defendants 
made any demand that the question of interest 
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be submitted to trre jury. Rule 49 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedur~ 'Special Verdicts and 
Interrogatories', provides in part 'as to an issue 
omitted without such demand, the Court may make a 
finding; or if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed 
to have made a finding in accord with the judgment 
on the verdict'. It therefore see~s clear that it 
was entirely proper for the Court, after return of 
the special verdict, to pass upon the question of 
interest, although ordinarily the question of 
whether or not interest should be allowed and from 
what date is for the jury." 
RULE 49(a) of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
provides in part as follows: 
"The court shall give to the jury, such explanation 
and instruction concerning the matter thus submitted 
as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its 
findings upon each issue. If in so doing, the Court 
omits any issue of fact raised by the pleadings or 
by the evidence, each party waives his right to a 
trial by jury of the issue so omitted, unless before 
the jury retires, he demands its submission to the 
jury. As to any issue omitted without such demand, 
the court may make a finding; or if it fails to do 
so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding in 
accordance with the "ud ment of the s ecial verdict." 
Un erlining a 
Defendants, pursuant to RULE 49(a), UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE, submitted proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and a proposed Judgment on the Verdict to 
the court below relative to the award of interest to the 
defendants (R 625-626; R 653-657; R 665-666). The court below 
declined to sign the same and denied the defendants' motion to 
add interest (R 669-670). For the reasons and based upon the 
authorities above cited, defendants submit that the court below 
was in error in refusing to add interest to the amount owing 
from plaintiff to the defendants and they urge this Court on 
appeal to so hold. 
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CONCLUSION 
The verdict of t~e jury with respect to its finding 
of wilful and malicious action on the part of defendant ROBERT R. 
SATHER toward the plaintiff is not supported by any competent 
or substantial evidence. The verdict of the jury with respect 
to its finding that the defendants SATHER are only entitled to 
reimbursement from the plaintiff for the sum of $21,500.00 of 
the $46,560.00 paid by the defendants on plaintiff's past due 
Trust Deed Note, guaranteed by the defendants, is likewise not 
supported by any competent or substantial evidence. This Court, 
in the interest of justice, should reverse the finding of 
malicious conduct on the part of defendant ROBERT R. SATHER, 
and should award the defendants SATHER the full sum of 
$46,560.00 against the plaintiff as reimbursement for their 
payment of plaintiff's obligation to the FIRST SECURITY BANK. 
The refusal of the court below to add interest to the 
amount due from the plaintiff to the defendants is likewise not 
supported by the la•>~ and equity, and the ruling of the court 
below in that regard should be reversed. 
In any event, should this Court decline to grant the 
affirmative relief sought herein by the defendants SATHER, the 
defendants SATHER should be granted a new trial on the issues 
herein raised. 
Res ectfully su Ltted, 
{:7·"/ ~ 
L cr:, ( /{.,LJ_(-.;-uDJ 
ullen Y. hristensen, for •.. 
CHRISTENi N, TAYLOR & MOODY 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Appellants 
55 East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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